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Abstract

Since the 1980s, scholars and development banks have recognized the link between judicial
institutions and economic growth. This thesis proposes to explore the role of judicial institutions
in the performance of economies and questions whether enhancing judicial institutions can result
in enhancing economic development in developing countries. Since the 1990s development banks
have explored the role of judicial institutions in the quest for economic development. Both the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have done this through the pursuit of
judicial reform efforts in countries with ailing economies. The focus has been on improving the
efficiency of the judicial system through reforms in the civil justice system. Through
documentary analysis, information was garnered relating to judicial institutions, the criminal
justice system and corruption, and their role with respect to economic development. The author
reviewed the traditional approach towards judicial reform which focused on the civil justice
system, and then suggests a novel, non-traditional approach which also emphasizes the role of the
judicial institution in respect to the criminal justice system and anti-corruption initiatives. This
study found that enhancing judicial institutions, through judicial reform efforts within both the
civil justice sector and the criminal justice sector minus corruption, may potentially enhance
economic development. The conclusion is that in order to enhance economic development,
resources should be channeled into enhancing judicial institutions to deal effectively with both
the civil justice system and the criminal justice system with an emphasis on the eradication of
corruption.

Keywords: judicial reform; judicial institutions; developing countries; economic development;
corruption; rule of law; criminal justice system, criminal law, corruption.
An Abstract of a Master’s thesis.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

In any society, but more so in developing countries, the significance of economic development
cannot be underscored. Economic development generally includes such trends as technological
innovation, improvements in the standard of living and life expectancy, and increases in the
amount of invested assets per capita. Some features of economic development tend to include
positive changes in socioeconomic structure, and progress in citizens’ quality of life.1
Since the 1980s, the link between judicial institutions and economic development has
been the subject of much discourse. Judicial institutions have gained recognition as important
institutions in the quest for economic development.2 The judicial system plays a fundamental
role in providing the necessary conditions for an operative market. A deficient judicial system
generates high transaction costs, especially in the case of increased contractual relationships, and
limits the extension of the market and possibilities of growth.3 This conversation about judicial
institutions, the judicial system and economic development is even more important today given
the state of the world economy. The 2008 global recession and collapse of the financial sector
saw many countries suffer from emergent challenges to their economic viability which inevitably
hindered development. In the 21st century, many arguments have been made as to the
determinants of economic development. Some have been tested while others remain mere
conjectures. Consequently, this study posits, all avenues to enhance economic development
should be explored to discover how best development can be achieved.
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BACKGROUND
Various scholars have discussed the role of institutions in the quest for economic development.4
Nobel Prize winner Douglass C. North, for example, wrote about the importance of institutions in
the analysis of economic performance and identified the judicial system as one such
institution.5North asserted that the role of the judicial system was to provide coercive
enforcement. He further contended that the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost

means of enforcing contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.6Other authors concurred, pinpointing the
judicial institution as an entity with an integral role to play in this quest for economic
development.7Consequently, there has been global emphasis on optimizing the function of the
judicial institution through judicial reform measures.
One of the key arguments for judicial reform is the need for a well-functioning legal
system as a precondition for economic development. The World Bank, and more recently the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have both played a major role in implementing judicial
reform measures aimed at enhancing the growth of economies in developing countries.
Some efforts at judicial reform are geared towards enhancing the judicial institution in
the execution of its role. However judicial reform encapsulates other activities outside of that
function. Richard Messick defined judicial reform in this way:
Judicial reform is part of a larger effort to make the legal systems in developing countries
and transition economies more market friendly. This broader legal reform movement
encompasses everything from writing or revising commercial codes, bankruptcy statutes,
and company laws through overhauling regulatory agencies and teaching justice ministry
officials how to draft legislation that fosters private investment. Although the line
4
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between judicial and legal reform blurs at the margin, the core of a judicial reform
program typically consists of measures to strengthen the judicial branch of government
and such related entities as the public prosecutor and public defender offices, bar
associations, and law schools.8

According to Messick, these measures aim to make the judicial branch independent,
speed the processing of cases, increase access to dispute resolution mechanisms and
professionalize the bench and bar.9
As the premier financial institution dealing with judicial reform, this thesis will examine
the role of the World Bank as well as the more recent efforts by the IMF. The World Bank and
IMF’s focus on commercial law and civil determinations may be based on the need to improve
market function across sectors and on the Washington Consensus.10 The Washington Consensus
emphasizes a neo-liberal view of globalization. It determines reform policies towards
macroeconomic development in countries undergoing fiscal crisis mode, such as Latin America,
the Caribbean, and most postcolonial territories. Traditionally, neither the IMF nor the World
Bank focused on judicial reform that incorporated reform in the criminal justice system. It will be
argued that any approach which fails to take into account the relationship between the different
sectors of the judicial system, and the fact that they are all intertwined, will be imprudent since
unilateral reform may be a waste of time and resources.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to address the proposed hypotheses, I propose the following questions:
1. Can enhancing or reforming judicial institutions lead to enhancing economic
development in developing countries?

8

Messick,“Judicial Reform and Economic Development,” 118.
Ibid., 118-119.
10
See World Health Organization on the Washington Consensus at
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story094/en/.
9

3

2. In reforming judicial institutions in developing countries what are the elements required
for a successful judicial reform project?
3.

Does it make sense to focus on some aspects of the justice system and not others?

4. In developing countries should judicial reform initiatives be focused not only on the civil
justice system but also the criminal justice system and anti-corruption initiatives?

THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis will consist of five chapters. In the first chapter, an introductory paragraph will serve
as a preamble to the background information. The hypothesis, as well as the research questions
will be presented, along with the methodological approach.
In the second chapter, the literature review will explore the empirical discourse on
economic development and judicial reform. Other related themes will be examined such as
corruption and the traditional approach towards judicial reform which focuses on the civil justice
system. The enforcement of contracts, debts and the protection of property as significant elements
that can influence economic growth will be assessed. Note the proposal does not suggest reform
focusing on the civil justice system is unimportant. On the contrary, it is acknowledged as being
of paramount importance; albeit the suggestion here is that they are simply one avenue in the
journey towards economic development. The non-traditional approach is also examined. The
argument is that countries experiencing significant problems with crime and violence,
accompanied by a large number of criminal cases should include reform to the criminal justice
system in any judicial reform project. Such reforms should include enhancing the capacity of the
judiciary to uphold human rights, standards and norms in criminal cases, as well as improving the
capacity of the judicial institution to deal effectively with breaches of the criminal law. I will
argue that reform to the criminal justice system is necessary to restore confidence in the judiciary,
ensure balance and guarantee access by all persons to a robust criminal justice system that
4

promotes fairness and equality. I also suggest that any such reform should heed the role of the
judicial institution in eradicating corruption. This position is important since high crime rates
tend to deter investors, and investments are essential for economic growth.11 If judicial reform
measures can be channeled towards the enhancement of judicial institutions, the result could be
high quality courts focused on strategies geared towards the reduction of crime and corruption.
This study will also explore measures the judicial institution can utilize to reduce the
incidence of crime. The hypothesis is that a reduction in crime will enable the country to be
viewed as a safer place for people to live, work and do business. The ambit of criminal justice
reforms is wide and expansive. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to discuss its wider
remit, and explore the aspects of criminal justice reform and criminal offences that correlate to
the economy, with specific attention to local and foreign investments. Aspects which will be
examined include serious crimes against the person, crimes against property, and corruption.
Although corruption is included in this listing, it will also be singly examined to ascertain
whether it has any impact on investments.
It will also be argued that corruption and anti-corruption initiatives must be included in
any program geared towards enhancing the judicial institution. Corruption presents a fruitful area
for research into ways it can thwart growth in the economy; as well as the role of judicial
institutions in advancing development and growth through available mechanisms. Emphasis will
also be placed on exploring the role that anti-corruption efforts, driven by the judicial institution
can play in influencing economic development.
The Methodology will be presented in the third chapter. Here the choice of document
analysis as a research method will be discussed and expanded. The Analysis and Implications will
form the fourth chapter. The thesis ends at Chapter five with the Conclusion. In this section
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further discussions and recommendations for future works and or avenues for judicial reform will
be presented.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review

The aim of this chapter is to review the literature dealing with judicial institutions, judicial
reform, the civil justice system, the criminal justice system, corruption and how they all relate to
economic development. This literature review is divided into three main sections, namely Judicial
Institutions and Economic Development, Criminal Justice and Economic Development, and
Corruption and Economic Development.

Judicial Institutions and Economic Development
As early as 1981, Douglass North expressed the view that the judicial institutions not only
determined the wealth of nations,1 it also responded to, helped create, change and sustain the
rules of the game- the institutional environment in which development took place.2He found that
competition played a critical role in inducing enforcement and that the judicial system provided
coercive enforcement.3
These suggestions situate the judicial institution out of the realm of the usual activities of
judges and courts. If it can be confirmed that judicial institutions can determine the wealth of
nations, then it is little wonder subsequent researchers have explored this notion. If the judicial
institution is indeed part of the rules of the game that determine wealth, then how this game is
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played in developing countries is an issue of great interest. Can they play this game under
prevailing conditions or is there need for a new breed of judicial institutions?
Researchers and development banks such as the World Bank maintain that in order for
judicial institutions to stimulate economic growth, reform is necessary.4 This is evident in the
large number of judicial reform initiatives implemented in the last few decades. It has been
suggested that judicial systems in developing countries and transition countries are choked with
inefficient procedures that cause unreasonable delays, and undermine the courts’ ability to
enforce judgments.5If it is true that these are the prevailing conditions in developing countries,

then judicial reform is a necessity from all angles.
Empowering judicial institutions to carry out tasks such as the impartial
enforcement of the law is a large part of what judicial reform efforts aim to achieve. The
function of enforcement, in a modern society, is primarily the responsibility of the
judicial system.6Ingram in a study of Brazil and Mexico from 1985 to 2010, noted that despite
the evidence of political and economic benefits from strong judicial institutions, courts are not
always empowered7This study further supported the assertion that judicial institutions in
developing economies necessitated judicial reform if these countries were to grow economically.
Researchers attempted to provide an overview of what a successful judicial reform project
entailed. Traditionally researchers found validity in focusing on enhancing the competency of the
judicial institutions in commercial and economic matters, which included the enforcement of
property and contract rights as important elements. Other researchers focused on the independence
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of the judicial institution. Yet other researchers suggested a large variety of elements were
necessary in such initiatives.8
Messick (1999) sought to address what constituted a successful judicial reform project. .
He acknowledged that little was known about the impact of the judicial system on economic
performance, and that there was a lack of agreement as to what made a successful judicial reform
project. Despite that assessment, many projects aimed at judicial reform in developing countries
were implemented. Messick concluded that crafting an efficient judicial reform project posed
several challenges and that before reform could take place there should be an in-depth analysis of
the country’s need. This analysis should be continually reviewed during the process of
implementation.9Despite those observations it was not always obvious that the country’s needs
were taken into account in all implemented projects.10
Although Messick provided no direct answer to the question of the components of a
successful project, he indicated that projects funded by development banks such as the World
Bank were premised on a legal system in which contracts between private parties were enforced
and the property rights of investors were respected.
Laver found that a sound judicial system was crucial to economic development. He
emphasized stimulating investment through a judicial system that protected property and
contractual rights, and adjudicated disputes without capriciousness and undue outside influence
based on its importance to private investors.

8
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Another work concerned about setting up institutions to spur economic growth, with
particular reference to developing or transition economies, was done by David F. Levi and Mitu
Gulati.11In their paper, the legal institution was one of the institutions examined. While the
authors acknowledged the focus was on the levels of protection given to property rights, they also
acknowledged the difficulty of correlating substantive laws to growth rates because of the
difficulty in determining causality. Legal institutions, they argued, served to enable easy
exchange in a variety of ways, for example, by providing clarity of property rights and flexibility
in protecting against opportunism problems. Focus had primarily been on the levels of protection
given to different types of property rights; protection to property rights being a key element of the
theoretical foundations of their research.
If the findings of North, Messick, Laver, Gulati and Levi were accepted, one would
determine that in any judicial reform project, the enhancement of the role of the judicial
institution in securing property and contract rights would an important element to include. Other
researchers concurred with this position. For example, Haggard, McIntyre, and Tiede suggested
the existence of a reasonably strong consensus, supported by both cross-national and survey
work, confirmed that property rights matter.12
This talk about the importance of property rights and contract rights is seemingly not
confined to any one region. Osman, Alexiou, and Tsalikin13 in researching the role of institutions
in economic development in 27sub-Saharan African countries found that several methods of
improving institutional infrastructure played key roles in delivering long-term economic
development. Some examples included enhancing the rule of law and quality of regulation,
improving contract enforcement, securing property rights, and reducing uncertainty.
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Some authors however are more cautious about how to approach this.
Chukwumerije,14for example, discussed the validity of the doctrine which professed a link
between the rule of law and economic development. On one hand he argued the promotion of a
stable and predictable legal environment in which individuals are free and able to contract, and
the provision of state support for the enforcement of contractual obligations, played a positive
role in fostering economic development through the rule of law. On the other hand he suggested
the relevance of the rule of law in this respect, may well be overstated because there were
countervailing considerations that would seem to indicate important limits to the primacy of the
doctrine as an engine of economic growth. Chukwumerije identified China as a country that had
achieved significant economic growth without any rule of law reforms. That example suggests
there is more to economic development than the rule of law.
The work of the World Bank on judicial reform has been quite extensive. Up until the
late 2000s the initiatives undertaken have followed the path of strengthening the independence of
the judiciary and focusing on property rights, contract, commercial and other aspects of the civil
justice system. Faundez15 explored the evolution of the World Bank’s approach towards legal
and judicial reform. At the time of authorship the Bank had spent over a decade implementing
judicial reform activities yet no success stories were related. He highlighted one of the flaws to
the approach of the World Bank as being its tendency to assess the quality of judiciaries in
developing countries in the same way they assessed the quality in developed countries.
Faundez argued further that the viewpoint and the approach taken by the World Bank
about the role of law were far too narrow. He noted the institution neglected to take into account
the fact that law does not merely have an economic dimension. Instead it is deeply embedded in
all aspects of social life, including the all-important political process of democratization.16
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Matthew Ingram’s work raised concerns about the judicial reform agenda in Brazil and
Mexico. He documented and explained variations in sub national judicial capacities across the 27
Brazilian and 32 Mexican states from 1985 to 2010.17His research design reflected a mixed
method approach, sequencing regression analyses and case studies as well as personal interviews,
archival analysis, direct observation and fieldwork.18 Ingram pointed out that the judicial reform
agenda in both Mexico and Brazil included but was not limited to policies geared towards
economic development. The key concern was to make courts efficient and competent for business
transaction and investors. He suggested this was the main focus of multilateral banks especially
the World Bank.19 In focusing on reform laws governing bankruptcy, taxation and investment
banks sought to make courts more competent in commercial and economic matters. The objective
was to attract foreign investors through reasonable treatment by the courts, and domestic
investors by building their confidence in enforcing laws relating to business transactions. Ingram
observed some tension between the economic cluster of activities and the social justice cluster of
activities, which was more concerned with promoting security through the criminal law. He
highlighted security as a concern for promoters of both democracy and markets. High crime rates
and insecurity eroded public trust and confidence in democratic institutions and tore at the social
fabric in ways that undermined support for democracy. High crime rates and insecurity also
intimidated investors and consumers, increased costs for the movement of goods, and dampened
business relations.20
The economic cluster of activities seems to have been dealt with separately and distinctly
from activities concerned with addressing security and crime. Themes like corruption and
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criminal justice were only marginally mentioned in relation to economic development and
judicial reform.
Indeed judicial reform projects tended to focus on enforcement of contracts and property
rights and the business side of the courts. If these were the components of a successful judicial
reform project why then was progress towards economic development so slow? This begs the
question whether there was something missing in this approach to judicial reform. Whereas some
focus has been placed on corruption as a factor inhibiting economic growth, there is a paucity of
literature on the criminal justice system and its relationship to economic development and whether
or not there is any value in examining the role of the criminal justice system as an aid to economic
development.

Criminal Justice and Economic Development
One of the few researchers to have paid attention to criminal law and its effect on economic
development is Richard Posner. In Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 21
he noted that a modernizing nation’s economic prosperity required, minimally, modest legal
infrastructure centered on the protection of property and contract rights. However he went on to
analyze the effects of criminal law on economic development. In discussing the grant of extensive
rights to criminals, Posner posits that this is bound to undermine the efficacy of criminal laws and
by doing so, unsettle property rights. Rights, he argued, made it harder to convict the guilty as
well as the innocent. Drawing a link between criminal law and property rights, Posner highlighted
the necessity to implement laws that improved the rights of accused persons and noted the
prevalence of acquisitive crimes in countries such as Russia, as a factor that retarded economic
growth. He asserted that in such countries a strict criminal law and a corresponding de-emphasis

21
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on the protection on civil liberties may be an important part of legal reform and an important tool
for the protection of property and contract rights.22 Posner’s observations were light years ahead
of the times, made when little if no regard was paid to criminal law and the criminal justice sector
in the discussion on economic development. It was not until around 2009 that a shift in the
approach of the World Bank was detected followed by their generation of interest in the criminal
justice system.
In 2011 a report on Central America identified crime and violence as being development
issues that also negatively impacted economic growth. Poor growth was attributed not only to the
victim’s lost wages and labor, but also pollution of the investment climate and diversion of scarce
government resources to strengthen law enforcement rather than promote economic
activity.23This was an interesting observation and subsequent to that time a few authors have
explored the criminal justice system and the criminal law with respect to economic development.
Lydia Tiede24 researched criminal justice reforms in Chile using original data sets to test
the impact of Chile’s criminal law reforms on the rights of criminals and economic development.
Chile’s criminal law reforms were aimed directly at enhancing the rule of law by making the
justice system more transparent, open, efficient and treating criminal defendants in a timely and
fair manner. Tiede recognized that only a few studies tested the effect of specific reforms on a
country’s legal development, and whether such reforms more broadly affected government’s
capacity and economic development.
The primary focus of her analysis was the impact of criminal law reforms on civil rights
and foreign direct investment (FDI). Specifically, Tiede found that the reforms had a positive
effect on regional economic development but only increased FDI in some regions. She found that
these results supported some scholars’ assertion about little direct link between civil rights and
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economic development. This is not to say that other legal reform measures would not bolster the
economy. Rather, for reforms to have an effect on the economy, they needed to be related more
closely to issues of economic concern such as enforcement of contracts and property rights.25
On the other hand, a recent work by Margaret Lewis26 examined China’s significant
economic growth and suggested that the role of criminal law ought to be seriously considered and
it would be a mistake not to do so.27 She noted that China’s economic development occurred
directly alongside the development of its criminal law. After tracing the history of the law and
development movement and its impact on China, Lewis suggested the government first used
criminal law to create a fundamental sense of security upon which economic activity could grow.
In the early years of China’s criminal law development the government waged campaigns against
“the three evils” (corruption, waste and bureaucracy) and “five poisons” (bribery, tax evasion,
stealing state property or obtaining it by fraud, cheating in workmanship, material or stealing state
economic intelligence).28
Lewis’s main contention was that criminal law mattered in China’s story of economic
development.29Lewis also suggested a direct relationship between the criminal law and economic
growth. Several factors were worth noting: the increase in prosecution for financial crimes or the
creation of new offences, and also the swift and harsh nature of the punishment dispensed for
economic crimes that contributed to this fast growth.
This was important for this period because of the re-thinking of the role of law and
development movement and because the reviews, in relation to the impact of economic
determinations, have been at best, mixed. There is insufficient empirical evidence establishing a
direct link between judicial reform and economic development and this begs the question whether
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or not policy makers, development banks and researchers are missing something. Could a
reference from China aid developing countries in other regions or is the situation peculiar to
China? Could the criminal law be the missing link?
.

Corruption and Economic Development
Whether developing countries involved in judicial reform initiatives should also focus on the role
of the judicial institution relative to corruption and anti-corruption will be discussed next.
Although the relationship between corruption and economic development has been the subject of
much research, the findings are somewhat mixed. Additionally, there is some debate about the
effect of corruption on economic development.
In an IMF Working Paper, Vito Tanzi examined the impact of corruption on economic
growth. While Tanzi recognized divergent views, he suggested that corruption is likely to reduce
economic growth. Among the factors contributing to this was reduced investment.30
Mendonca and Fonseca conducted analysis based on cross-country data questioning the
effect of corruption on income and ways to mitigate corruption. The main results from this
empirical analysis were highlighted in two points. First, the idea that corruption is intrinsically
connected with income is confirmed. In particular, it is observed that an improvement in CPI is
capable of promoting a positive effect on income per capita for both developing and developed
countries. Second, the traditional argument that an increase in rule of law represents a good
strategy in the fight against corruption is valid for developing countries.31 The authors examined
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and observed that a higher level of rule of law is
associated with a lower level of corruption. They also found that an increase in rule of law for the
case of emerging countries represents a powerful instrument for inhibiting corruption. The
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absence of statistical significance for developed countries is justified due to the fact that the rule
of law in these countries is already high.
In Daniel Kaufmann’s Judicial Corruption Index32 skeptics of the anti-corruption agenda
are quick to highlight countries such as Bangladesh that score poorly on most cross-country
assessment of corruption but managed to report impressive growth performance over the past
decade. Kaufman however referred to this as an exception which should not be confused with the
more general empirical finding that corruption adversely affects growth in the medium to long
run.33
Marc Freckleton, Allan Wright, and Roland Craigwell examined the relationship between
economic growth, FDI and corruption. They collected data from World Bank and IMF statistics
on 42 developing countries and 28 developed countries during the period 1998 to 2008. Their
analysis of the data revealed that corruption had a significant impact on foreign direct investment
in the short run than it did in the long run. The fact that corruption had an impact, albeit limited
on foreign direct investment is instructive.
The question of the impact of FDI is directly addressed by Castro Conceicao and Pedro
Nunes in Does Corruption Inhibit Foreign Direct Investment?34
They conducted a study of the impact of corruption on FDI in 73 countries. Although
their study was not limited to developing countries, findings were applicable on a broad scale.
The conclusion they arrived at included the fact that to attract FDI, a host country had to promote
a favorable environment to investors. This also meant transparent political institutions, that is,
low corruption in order not to increase business cost. Both authors highlighted corruption as a
crucial determinant of FDI inflows. Countries which took effective measures to combat
corruption may attract more FDI than those who did not.35He also found that corruption
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potentially reduced foreign investment based on uncertainty which increased in environments
with higher corruption, as well as the cost of doing business.
If it is true that corruption has the potential to inhibit economic growth, then the role of
the judicial institution in combating corruption is an important one for consideration. Judicial
institutions that are strengthened to effectively enforce corruption prevention law may be able to
combat corruption. Susan Rose-Ackerman36 explored the topic and suggested six possible
solutions to help curb corruption. Among them and coming in at fourth place was the solution
that the state should enforce bribery laws against major offenders both inside and outside of
government37. However she cautioned that law enforcement ought never to be the primary means
of fighting entrenched corruption.
A more recent contribution by Ackerman and Soreide38 observed the close relationship
between estimated corruption control and the level of sanctions imposed on those found guilty of
corruption. They highlighted the need to address serious acts of corruption within the criminal
justice system by available means such as fines, imprisonment or dismissal from a government
position.
The literature raised concerns about the role of the judicial institutions vis a vis
corruption as well as the anti-corruption agenda. This will be the subject of further analysis
throughout this paper.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain whether or not the enhancement of judicial institutions in
developing nations can result in enhancing economic development. In an attempt to address those
questions, documentary analysis, a qualitative method was utilized. Documentary analysis is a
systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents.1Documents can serve a variety of
purpose as part of a research undertaking. They provide background and context, answers to
additional questions, supplementary data, track changes and developments, and verify findings
from other data sources. Moreover, documents may be the most effective means of gathering data
when events can no longer be observed or when informants have forgotten the details.2
This research method was selected because of the abundance of available literature
linking judicial institutions with economic development and the need to present existing
information. It was necessary to present a comprehensive background into the traditional and
non-traditional view of the relationship between the judicial institution and economic
development. The literature examined also provided insight into how academic researchers,
scholars, jurists, development banks personnel and policy makers thought and how the thought
process evolved over almost four decades to become what it is currently. The aim was to provide
the reader with authentic information of the subject area and to place this study within the context
of other research, looking at the challenges and presenting new thoughts on the subject. The
Literature Review comprised the main documentary analysis.
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Documents, as a record of human activity, provide a valuable source of data. Along with
interviews and observations, they comprise one of the main forms of data sources for
interpretation and analysis. Document analysis can provide a window into a variety of historical,
political, social, economic, and personal dimensions of the case beyond the immediacy of
interviews and observations.3 Researchers using documents as a data source need to both broaden
and narrow their scope, ensuring that they use documents that provide a rich variety of
information focused on their particular research purpose.4 Documentary analysis can prove to

be quite useful as it provides support for a particular hypothesis. The method is
advantageous because it is efficient, as it is less time consuming; available, meaning
many documents are available in the public domain; and cost effectiveness as it is less
costly than other research methods.5
Document analysis however is not always advantageous, as it usually does not
provide sufficient detail to answer a research question.6One of the main drawbacks
encountered in this study was that findings depended on the quality of the information
contained in the reviewed documents. In an attempt to overcome this deficiency, a wide
range of documents was scanned before settling on select documents to reference.
Another drawback to the use of this methodology was the fact that the results may be
inconclusive. It might have been possible to arrive at a direct causal relationship through
a process of data collection or cross country analysis but for the time constraints. The
collection of data over a period of years after the implementation of projects would have
to be collected. This is because economic development does not occur within a short time
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span but can take years. The use of questionnaires and interviews might have been
helpful to the extent that they have enabled triangulation and enhanced validity.
This analysis entailed the review of literature obtained through electronic databases such
as JStor, Proquest, Google and Google Scholar. Websites visited included the World Bank, IMF,
as well as Transparency International with specific reference to the Corruption Prevention Index.
Keywords utilized in the search engines were: judicial institutions, rule of law, judicial reform,
economic development, criminal justice system, criminal law, corruption, anti-corruption and
foreign direct investments.
Over 60 different documents were examined. In some cases general information was
noted but not specifically referred to. Some of the studies examined used documentary analysis as
their primary research method; others utilized cross country analyses, quantitative and other
research techniques. While some of the documents examined focused on the justice system and
its relationship to the economy, others were confined to corruption and economic development
and a few dealt with the criminal law and the criminal justice system.
A lot of the research was linked to property, contracts, debt enforcement, commercial law
and economic development. Few studies referred to any causal link between economic
development, judicial institutions and the criminal justice system. Each article was examined
within the context of the earlier research questions. Secondary questions were: “What does the
article suggest about the link between judicial institutions and economic development? Is there
any suggestion that judicial institutions can aid in promoting economic development? If so how
does the author contend that this is done? What interventions or reforms are suggested that would
facilitate economic growth? Does the author pay any regard to the criminal justice sector and to
anti-corruption initiatives? Are these initiatives influenced by the ability to attract foreign direct
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investment and other types of investments in developing nations? What suggestions are made for

optimizing the role of the judicial institution?”
Although the results arrived at were not conclusive they provided some food for thought
and material for further research. Whereas there exists an abundance of literature on the
general role of the judicial institution in reforming the justice system, and reasonable
literature on the impact of corruption, there appears to be a dearth of scholarly literature
on the impact changes in the criminal justice system, effected by the judicial institution,
can have on economic growth. It is expected that this thesis will contribute to the
literature on the role of the judicial institution in influencing growth through the means
discussed herein.
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis and Implications

The Traditional Approach
Much of the efforts at judicial reform have been spearheaded by the World Bank. From the 1990s
onward, the World Bank implemented judicial reform projects as part of its initiatives in several
nations. The Latin American and Caribbean initiative projects were implemented in countries
such as Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.1 The rationale for such assistance
was built on the assumptions that the rule of law promotes economic growth and reduces poverty,
and that it does so by enhancing opportunity, empowerment, and security through laws and legal
institutions.2Much of these reforms, although they acknowledged the importance of generally
upholding the rule of law, were oriented toward making courts efficient and competent for
business transactions and investors.3 The goal was to enable the business community and foreign
investors to have access to the efficient adjudication of any conflict that arose in the course of
their transactions.4
Some of the elements of judicial reform projects included strengthening of judicial
decisions, advancing insolvency proceedings while modernizing selected commercial courts,
strengthening of the judicial system to handle business-related cases and also providing anticorruption support.5 It was felt that the inability of the judicial systems to effectively deal with
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these issues resulted in higher transaction cost for businesses and this resulted in the retardation
of economic growth. Hence judicial reform was part of the larger effort to make legal systems in
developing countries more market friendly.6
The IMF’s approach to judicial reform has been similar to that of the World Bank. An
example of this is the more recent judicial reform initiative of the IMF in Portugal, implemented
as part of their program to improve the Portuguese economy.7The economic relevance of this
program was substantiated through the economics literature. These works recognized the
importance of a predictable and efficient system of property rights and effective enforcement of
civil and commercial claims for economic growth.8
At the time of the implementation of this program, one of the main problems affecting the
growth of Portugal’s economy was the inability to attract foreign investment. The focus of the
IMF was on commercial cases and the civil justice system. Nowhere was there any mention of
reducing the backlog of criminal cases or of improving the efficiency in criminal case processing.
A brief look at the IMF in Indonesia9showed support for a judicial reform program
focused on economic stabilization, and reform by changing the bankruptcy regime and
establishing new commercial courts. This was despite the fact that the conditions on the ground
were characteristic of corruption, incompetence, mis-orientation, and organizational breakdown
with the courts, prosecution, and the police being underfunded and self-funded.10Undoubtedly,
these conditions demonstrated the need for reform to other aspects of the justice system yet the
focus was on the creation of commercial courts. It stands to reason then, that a program aimed at
curbing corruption and at addressing deficiencies in the criminal justice sector might have been
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better suited for Indonesia at that time. Regrettably, the program only addressed the business side
of the justice system.
In the normal course of events, reforms to the civil justice system which focus on
commercial cases and other types of cases that dealt with business transactions may be more
obviously linked to economic development. The fact that judicial reform programs were designed
with a focus on market efficiency and friendliness of the economy seems sensible and may reap
benefits in a society where the main factors inhibiting efficiency in the justice system are related
to business transactions. However where this was done without regard to the specific needs of a
locale this may result in wasted resources. In the case of economic development the answers may
depend on the country’s needs.11In many developing countries there are usually problems with
crime, violence and corruption. Where high rates of crime and violence prevail, this can have
both direct effects on human welfare in the short-run and longer run effects on economic growth
and social development.12 Where crime and violence are prevalent, this may require interventions
to the criminal justice sector rather than to the civil justice sector.
Throughout this thesis I argue that it is especially important that developing countries
experiencing problems with crime and violence, accompanied by a high volume of criminal cases
in the courts, include criminal justice reforms and anti-corruption initiatives in any judicial reform
project. It is important that judicial reform programs consider the relationship between the
different sectors of the judicial system and the fact that they are all intertwined. To reform one
sector without regard to the other may result in a waste of time and resources.
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The Non-Traditional Approach
The traditional approach does not appear to have reaped the desired success. In the case of
Colombia the outcome was unsatisfactory whereas for Guatemala and Ecuador outcomes were
satisfactory. 13No resounding successes were reported. In recent years there has been a slight shift
from the exclusive focus on business transactions. Increasingly, development banks now
recognize that crime and violence are also development issues.
In a 2011 World Bank Report, crime and violence were described as variables that
significantly dampened the business investment climate. This is because it skewed the
calculations that shaped opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs
and expand. Three main cost factors were included in the investment decision:
(i)

the potential losses to criminal activity discussed;

(ii)

the cost of diverting resources from productive (and hence growth-enhancing)
activities to crime prevention; and

(iii)

lost productivity resulting from crime-caused fear, increased absenteeism or
limitation of working hours to times of the day when workers are not concerned
with personal security.14

A Staff Guidance Note15 addressed the question of the importance of criminal justice
sector assistance by pointing out that high levels of crime and violence are recognized as
fundamental challenges to economic growth, and that a number of countries have voiced interest
in support for criminal justice reform programs.16 It was noted that the institutions of the criminal
justice sector contributed to citizen security and safety, held criminals accountable in a fair and
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equitable manner, protected and restored the rights of victims, and provided alternative solutions
to reduce crime. Among the institutions identified as being involved in the criminal justice sector
are courts, the judiciary, judicial schools, training academies and anti-corruption entities.17 It was
further noted that criminal justice institutions are particularly key in addressing corruption
because corruption covers a range of criminal activities that undermine and derail economic
development and that an effective, credible and reliable criminal justice system is indispensable
to a country’s ability to combat corruption.18
The role of justice institutions in assisting to counter corruption was also highlighted in
New Directions in Justice Reform: A Companion Piece to the Updated Strategy.19Justice systems
were identified as having three developmental functions, namely; preventing and mitigating
conflict, crime and violence; ensuring executive accountability; and fostering private sector
growth in compliance with legal and regulatory framework.20
A major theme running throughout the criminal justice sector is that of anti-corruption
activities. Corruption also stands on its own as a factor that inhibits investments and therefore
represents a significant challenge to development. One of the lessons learnt from the traditional
approach is that the approach to judicial reform and economic development cannot be a one size
fits all approach. The design of projects aimed at spurring economic development should take
into account the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country. Where crime and
violence are present this may impact the likelihood of attracting investments. In that scenario it
would be futile to focus only on the civil justice system and improve on the ability of the
judiciary to enforce contracts, property rights and cases that address business transactions. On one
hand investors would be encouraged to invest and on the other, they would be discouraged
because of crime, violence and security concerns.
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The civil justice system has been the subject of many studies and so it is not the aim of
this thesis to enter into any further analysis of the civil justice system and its reform with respect
to the judicial institution. Instead the objective is to delve into seldom explored areas–the
criminal justice system and corruption with a reference to their relationship to investments. In the
sections that follow I analyze ways in which the judicial institution can operate in the criminal
justice system and also in the fight against corruption geared towards effecting positive changes
in the economy.

The Criminal Justice System
The definition accorded to the criminal justice system by the World Bank 21 is that sector which
comprises all of the institutions, processes and services responsible for the prevention,
investigation, adjudication, treatment, and response to illegal behaviors. The sector includes the
institutions traditionally associated with it, such as police, prosecutors, public defenders, courts and
corrections, as well as a wide range of other institutions such as private police, victim services,
private lawyers and bar associations, human rights and ombudsman’s offices, addiction and other
treatment programs as well as community engagement and service programs.
The criminal justice system remains an essential tool in crime and violence control and,
to some extent, in their prevention.22 Although academics and researchers are divided as to the
real impact of the criminal justice system on reducing crime, it has been posited that this
uncertainty cannot be an excuse for inaction. This is especially so for governments facing
increasing levels of crime and violence and citizen demands that they do something about them.23
The critical nature of addressing crime is even more evident in countries whose criminal justice
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systems have languished unattended for decades, lack the technical and human resources to
respond to less traditional types of crime, have not adopted new standards of transparency and
accountability, or have themselves been penetrated by political and occasionally, criminal
elements.24
Where high crimes rates result in a large volume of criminal cases in the courts, an onus
is placed on the judges and courts to reduce this volume by expeditious adjudication. Where this
is not the case, citizens may lose faith in the judicial institution and resort to alternate means for
justice. One consequence of a weak court system or judicial system is that vigilante justice is
often utilized as citizens, when faced with difficulties of accessing justice, inordinate delay or a
lack of convictions sometimes take justice into their own hands. Additionally where the criminal
justice system is not effective this will result in ordinary, law abiding citizens being put at risk of
crimes being committed against them. Additionally, and far less straightforward, crime has
potentially deleterious consequences on growth, through reduced productivity and shortened
planning horizons for investments in physical and human capital.25
The fact that crime can negatively impact the confidence of local and foreign investors
makes it necessary for interventions in the criminal justice sector to mitigate this. An effective
criminal justice system is capable of not only investigating criminal cases successfully but also
adjudicating them with equal success. Although there are many institutions involved in the
criminal justice sector, the successful adjudication of such cases is largely dependent on the
quality of the judicial institution. In enhancing the role of the judicial institution the focus should
be on mechanisms geared toward making the judiciary and the court more efficient in carrying
out their duties. A more efficient justice system is one in which perpetrators of crimes and acts of
violence are brought to justice swiftly and fairly, ensuring at all times that the defendant’s human
rights are upheld.
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Expediting the rate at which criminal cases are disposed may aid in building the
confidence of ordinary citizens in the ability of the judicial institution to resolve crimes. This is
not always dependent on the judge, as other variables exist, such as the availability of witnesses,
the presence of legal representatives and of course the availability of venue and time. The role of
the judge is paramount. Judges can ensure the expeditious disposition of these cases when they
come up for trial and also implement targeted backlog reduction strategies for older cases through
the use of case management strategies. The sentencing power of the judiciary is a major tool
available which can send appropriate messages relating to crime and violence. Imposing
sentences that are just and commensurate to the crime is one way in which the judiciary can
effectively adjudicate and aid in deterring would be offenders.
Where offenders are convicted of financial crimes and where the law permits, judges can
deal effectively with the forfeiture of assets. This can be a valuable tool for seizing the assets of
drug offenders and other criminals but requires the necessary legal framework as not all
developing countries have laws and rules dealing with the proceeds of crime and the confiscation
of ill-gotten gains.

Corruption
The role that judicial institutions can play in influencing economic development through
mechanisms that address corruption is a question of importance. This is because some studies
have demonstrated that the presence of corruption increases the cost of business and as a
consequence discourages potential investors from investing.26
If institutions, including the judicial institution have a role to play in the eradication of
corruption, then where such institutions do not exist governments should endeavor to create
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institutions which foster this. Where they exist, but are not adequate they should be empowered
and strengthened to effectively address corruption. In examining the causes of corruption the
contention is that corruption tends to flourish when institutions are weak and government policies
generate economic rents.27If corruption flourishes when institutions are weak then the converse
may also be true; if institutions, including the judicial institution are strengthened to combat
corruption, this may assist in its eradication.
I have sought to ascertain how the judicial institution can impact the level of corruption
within the society. In order for the judicial institution to be effective, it is therefore essential to
ensure that the judicial institution is not involved in or perceived as being involved in corruption.
If the judicial institution is expected to be a driver of change then they should be impeccable and
above reproach. However sparse the incidence of judicial corruption, when it occurs, the impact
is great and may be unforgettable. One of the means by which judicial conduct can be curtailed is
by the creation of a code of ethics. The Bangalore Principles28 served to guide many developing
nations in their search for a structured code of ethics. Codes of conduct strengthen the integrity of
judges and improve public perception of the courts by clarifying the behavior expected of judges.
29

Having a code of ethics constitutes an effective control mechanism against unethical behavior

and corruption.
The role of the judicial institution in combating corruption should extend to the way in
which the judiciary treats with corruption offences as an aspect of criminal law. Corruption
offences can range from petty bribery to serious fraud and sometimes include the
misappropriation of public funds. The criminal law allows for the identification and seizure of
assets of convicted persons. Strengthening of the judicial institution includes ensuring that there
are sufficient judges who are equipped with the necessary tools, are sensitized, and educated to
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deal with cases involving corruption. The creation of specialist courts and specialist judges to
deal with cases involving corruption is worth implementing. Courts must expeditiously, but
fairly, adjudicate the resulting cases, and the penalties imposed on those convicted must be
sufficient to dissuade others from similar acts.30
The creation of efficient laws to govern cases involving corruption is another step
towards addressing corruption. According to Susan Rose Ackerman law enforcement ought never
to be the primary method of fighting entrenched corruption.31Despite the fact that enforcement
does not start with the judicial institution, the judiciary has a role to play.
Coercive enforcement is a tool available to the judiciary. This can take the form of stiff
penalties for such offences. Enforcement does not begin with the judiciary but rather with the
legislature followed by the prosecution. The sentencing powers of the judge may in some
instances require legislative intervention to ensure that the nature of the corrupt activity is suitable
to the scope of available punishment mechanisms. Ackerman emphasizes that judges have the
ability to send signals through their sentencing power, of the pronouncements of prohibition.
Where persons fall short of being convicted due to technical gaps in the evidence, there is an
avenue for recommendation for disciplinary proceedings or other sanctions.
Necessary to the process of the strengthening of the judiciary is the training and capacity
building of other court personnel. Training should also include the prosecutorial arm, as well as
sensitization of the administrative staff. Gonzales de Asis is supportive of this approach which is
evident in her focus on Rule of Law programs which included training not only judges but also
prosecutors and administrative staff in the new domain of international anti-corruption laws.
Organizations such as Transparency International have a key role to play in assisting
countries to deal effectively with corruption. Transparency International brings together scholars,
legal professionals and civil society activists from around the world to examine how, why and
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where corruption mars judicial processes and to reflect on remedies for corruption-tainted
systems.32The organization focuses on judges and courts, situating them within the broader justice
system and exploring the impact of judicial corruption on human rights, economic development
and governance. Their mandate is to combat corruption and in doing so focus on prevention and
reform systems.33An examination of the Corruption Perception Index 34revealed that developing
countries usually find themselves at the lower end of the ranking. This means that they are
perceived as being more corrupt. One interpretation is that countries with more corruption face
more challenges transition to become developed countries. Another interpretation is that once
countries are developed they become less corrupt. Either way there appears to be some
relationship with the level of perceived corruption and the economic status of a country.

Implications
Scholars continue to debate the link between judicial institutions, property and contract
rights, judicial independence, criminal law, corruption and economic development. Nothing in the
literature reviewed suggests that empowering judicial institutions is a negative move. In fact
while some question whether empowering judicial institutions is the cause and not the
consequence of economic development, and others question whether it is possible to establish a
causal link between the two; it is acknowledged that there is a strong association between judicial
institutions and economic development.
Similarly, there is no debate on the need for judicial reform in developing nations
particularly because resources are usually scarce and allocation of sufficient resources to the
justice sector is usually a challenge. In some developing nations the judiciary is not provided with
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the tools required to effectively execute its role. The literature suggests that overall there is a
strong case to be made for enhancing judicial institutions
An examination of the literature suggests that the idyllic approach to judicial reform is one
which is designed after an in-depth analysis of the country, and one designed to meet the needs of
the particular society. Not only is it necessary to conduct an analysis of the prevailing conditions
in the country before implementing any reform, but it is equally necessary to continue assessment
during implementation. The argument that the traditional approach of limiting reform to civil
determinations, enforcement of contracts and property may result in wasting resources is largely
based on common sense. On one hand there are investors who are keen on markets that can provide
some guarantee to their business transactions; and may be likely to invest. On the other hand where
investors lack confidence to invest, either because of crime and violence or because of the increased
transactional costs, this will inhibit investments. Additionally, where corruption is prevalent, this
further serves to erode their confidence or serve to further increase the cost of business. No
discourse on this topic would be complete without significant regard to the independence of the
judiciary. The literature suggests that this has to be the starting point for any enhancement or
empowerment of the judicial institution. This is because an independent and efficient judiciary
supported by a modern legal framework and trained with appropriate techniques to investigate cases
of corruption would by itself reduce corruption.35
Where judicial institutions are enhanced they must be fully equipped to effectively carry
out their functions. If judicial reform measures are aimed at improving the capacity of the judicial
institution to execute their functions in the civil justice system and the criminal justice sector in
developing countries, I argue that this has potential implication for the growth of their economies.
The suggestions from the literature are that there is value to focusing on the protection of property
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rights and also that there may be some value to focusing on enforcing property laws and laws
relating to economic crimes.36
With respect to the main hypothesis that the criminal law has a role to play in spurring
economic development, the literature contains conflicting arguments. Posner argued that granting
extensive rights to defendant may result in unsettling of property rights and also suggests that
where acquisitive crime is rampant it may retard economic development. Conversely, Tiede
found that such improvements could lead to an increase in labor force and result in some growth.
Her findings though are more indicative of some relationship where a country has no security
measures to protect private property or when the prosecution of economic crimes is being
discussed. Although I would not agree wholeheartedly with the suggestion by Lewis that criminal
law pays, the suggestions she makes about the case of China’s fast economic growth is linked to
the robust prosecution and enforcement of property and economic crimes and is worth further
exploration. Although the link between economic development and crimes affecting security
seems more elusive than the link between economic development and property crimes, there is a
significant shift in the World Bank scholarship to a position of confidence in the use of the
criminal justice system as a tool in the control of crime and violence.
As it relates to corruption, there are a few who question the level of causation associated
with economic development and corruption. A preponderance of literature suggests more than
just a casual association or connection with economic development and corruption. If these
findings are substantiated, then empowering judicial institutions to fight against corruption by
greater enforcement and swifter sanctions could have the potential to reduce the incidence of
corruption in the society. If corruption reduces the likelihood of investments then the converse
would also be true that less corruption may result in more investments. Despite some cynicism,
the findings are supportive of this position. What is clear though is that a lot of work remains to
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be done to provide more evidence of the link that judicial institutions can play in the fight against
corruption. Although the evidence is mixed, and there is room for further research, the findings
are deductive. This study posits that empowering judicial institutions through judicial reform
within both the civil justice and the criminal justice systems minus corruption can potentially
enhance economic development.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The enhancement of judicial institutions, if the result is the enhancement of economic
development is dependent on a number of factors. Among those factors is the nature of the
enhancement activities. These have largely taken the form of judicial reform initiatives. The
findings have shown that the exact nature of reform activities should be determined by the needs
of the country. Although the exact nature of activities required for economic development to
occur has not been directly established, the literature suggests a number of responsible variables.
Among those noted are the enforcement of property and contract rights, the establishment of anticorruption initiatives and interventions in the criminal law and criminal justice system. The link
between judicial institutions, economic development and anti-corruption initiatives and
corruption has been explored and the findings have suggested the existence of this link. However
the link between judicial institutions, economic development and the criminal justice system has
not been as clear cut. Although the findings are suggestive the challenge remains to provide
empirical data to give validity to the hypothesis that enhancements of judicial institutions in the
nature of criminal justice reforms have the potential to enhance economic development.
There is no shortage of literature exploring the general relationship between economic
development, judicial institutions and judicial reform. The more I learn about the relationship
between them is the more I contend that there must be something missing. Many years have
passed and billions of dollars have been spent on enhancing judicial institutions through judicial
reform efforts aimed at stimulating economic development in some developing countries. Yet
these countries have failed to acquire the level of growth required to shift them from being
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“developing” to being “developed” countries. Are they missing something? Could the missing
link be criminal law and the criminal justice system?
Although development banks and developing countries have expressed an interest in the
criminal justice system there is still a paucity of literature exploring the link between criminal
justice systems and economic development. It is unusual that despite suggestions of criminal law
being linked to development there are still few reforms to the criminal justice sector embarked on
by development banks. The criminal justice sector still takes a back seat when economic
development is being discussed. Lewis, Posner, and Tiede are few of the authors who have
explored the role of the criminal law in economic development. Both Posner and Tiede examined
the criminal law reform with respect to the rights of defendants. Tiede went further and related it
to property and economic crimes. Lewis delved deeper and questioned whether criminal law can
be used to target a broader array of activities detrimental to economic growth. She also discussed
the need to harness the power of criminal law against people engaged in corruption and other
economically detrimental activities. Lewis focused mainly on property crimes but World Bank
scholarship has identified both crime and violence as being factors that restrict economic growth.
A World Bank study identified weak criminal justice institutions as compounding problems with
crime and violence in Central America.1
Common sense would also dictate that a safe country would produce more growth than
one which is unsafe as it is difficult to envisage property rights if there are concerns about life and
limb. Criminal justice reforms have been contemplated specifically with economic development
in mind in the case of Central America.2 If crime and violence are identified as development
issues then the role of the judicial institution, as one of the key institutions involved in the
criminal justice institution, must be paramount in addressing these issues. The ambit of the
criminal law is vast and encompasses a wide range of crimes to include crimes against the person,
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crimes against property, drug related crimes, financial crimes, and of course, corruption. Any
robust approach to criminal justice reforms and criminal law must be keen to consider all types of
crimes while simultaneously bearing in mind the rights of defendants and the observation of due
process.
This study has limitations as the conclusions arrived at are based solely on the
scholarship in the field. Based on these limitations it is impossible to make any bold statements.
What is clear is the need for more empirical research to establish that the conclusions are more
than just conjectures or speculations. Elements of justice are difficult to measure but not
impossible. Measuring or establishing the direct link between judicial institutions will require
resources, investment in the process and sufficient time for the penetration of reforms to take

place. There is need for further research using quantitative approaches, collecting data from
countries that have implemented programs of criminal justice reform and cross-tabulate those
with countries that have not implemented programs. Any such research would benefit from
specific case studies on developing countries plagued with problems of crime, violence,
corruption and who are experiencing challenges with their criminal justice system. Further
research may help to answer questions raised by this thesis. This may be important to public
policy decision makers, economists, social workers, scholars and jurists in developing countries.
If enhancing the capacity of the judicial institution to deal effectively with breaches of the
criminal law, corruption prevention laws, and implementing anti-corruption strategies in a
country can result in economic development, then it may be worthwhile to invest significantly in
the justice sector. This may be an interesting proposition to public policy decision makers in the
ministries of justice in some developing countries. Investments in justice ministries are
sometimes lacking. It is hoped that this study will cause a reconsideration of this position and that
more investments will be channeled into judicial institutions. Hopefully this thesis will stimulate
further interest in the potential impact of interventions in the criminal justice sector. The premise
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is that the researches a continuation of the interests raised by other authors in the ability of the
judicial institution to effect developmental changes through interventions in the criminal justice
sector.
The main contribution of this thesis was to generate interest in this aspect of the law and
the role that judicial institutions can play if adequately enhanced and empowered to address any
deficiencies in the criminal justice system. The role of judicial institutions in the development of
economies is a broad and rich field. I have merely sought to identify some aspects that may
benefit from further research and scholarship. All areas that can contribute to enhancing
economic development must be explored.
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